

Nationalism, Collaboration, and Resistance

France under Nazi Occupation

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Does nationalism produce resistance to foreign intervention? The growing popularity of right-wing nationalist parties in Europe, as well as the 2016 electoral victory of Donald Trump on a campaign platform that espoused nationalist messages and promised to “Make America Great Again,” exemplify the potential power of nationalism in the political arena. Nationalist rhetoric, perhaps today more than ever, appears to be an effective tool capable of both reinforcing boundaries between a state’s citizens and outsiders and intensifying fears of threats to state sovereignty.

The scholarly literature on nationalism likewise emphasizes the potential for nationalism to heighten emotions such as anger and fear, to increase solidarity against perceived threats to the nation, and to produce intergroup violence.¹ To free the nation from foreign domination, nationalists will endure hardship and conflict, even sacrificing their own lives. Nationalists also will eschew collaboration with enemies, military desertion or cowardice, and interethnic co-

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1. See, for example, David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeeded or Fail,” *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 49–91, doi:10.1162/0162288041762913; Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 715–735, doi:10.2307/2945838; Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Roger D. Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27–47, doi.org/10.1080/00396339308442672; Barry R. Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80–124, doi:10.2307/2539098; Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993); Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5–39, doi:10.2307/2539176; and Andreas Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

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operation. In these accounts, nationalism is expected to produce a fairly uniform response to threatening outsiders: resistance.

Yet committed nationalists can exhibit paradoxical behavior when addressing threats to the nation. The political climate in the United States during and after the 2016 elections provides a contemporary illustration. During the presidential campaign, media reports showed a Trump base that was fired up by his anti-immigration rhetoric, regularly chanting “Build the Wall!” at his rallies and applauding his call for Mexico to pay for strengthening U.S. borders. Trump also promised to stand firm against external enemies, pledging to destroy the Islamic State and confront China.² His nationalist fervor appeared to resonate with a large segment of the Republican Party.³

When allegations of Russian interference in the U.S. campaign began to dominate the headlines after the election, however, neither Trump nor his supporters appeared overly concerned. Instead, Trump called the press coverage a “witch hunt” and reiterated his admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin. The reaction to allegations of Russian meddling was highly polarized along party lines. A December 2016 NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll found that while 86 percent of Democrats were bothered by Russian interference, only 29 percent of Republicans shared these concerns.⁴

How can one make sense of this willingness to ignore or downplay Russian interference? It is puzzling that a base of supporters with overtly nationalist commitments, who applauded prioritizing the United States and Americans over others, would be so sanguine about the prospect that a historic enemy of the United States had interfered in a national election, a cornerstone of American democracy. At the least, would committed nationalists not be expected to denounce the idea of Russian intervention in a U.S. election, even if they were not persuaded that such an intervention had occurred?

In this article, we question the relationship between nationalist commitments and resistance to foreign intervention. We argue that nationalism is a malleable ideology that can be harnessed to support diverse, even contradictory, policy positions regarding foreign threats to the nation. Nationalist com-

2. On his commitment to destroying the Islamic State, see “Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress,” February 28, 2017. In his 2016 manifesto, *Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), Trump describes China as an enemy and calls the One China policy into question.

3. See, for example, Samantha Schmidt and Jasper Scherer, “The Postelection Hate Spike: How Long Will It Last?” *Washington Post*, November 14, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/14/making-sense-of-the-post-election-spike-in-harassment-and-intimidation-how-much-how-long/?utm_term=.e84035fd53be.

4. Mark Murray, “Poll: 55 Percent Concerned about Russia’s Interference in Election,” *NBC News*, December 18, 2016, <http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/poll-55-percent-concerned-about-russia-s-interference-election-n697391>.

mitments do not uniformly lead to resistance to foreign intervention. They are also consistent with efforts to de-emphasize external threats, acquiesce to foreign involvement, or even actively collaborate with enemy nations. In the simplest terms, knowing that individuals want to defend their nation does not determine their means in pursuing this end. Even among staunch nationalists, profound disagreements may emerge over the best way to interpret and respond to threats from foreign powers. Against the existing literature that takes nationalism to be an important cause of resistance to incursions on national soil, we suggest that nationalism's power to explain variation in political behavior is much more limited than prior scholarly work suggests.

Instead, we examine the ways that political competition, both domestic and international, shapes responses to foreign intervention. Partisan commitments, such as those present in the ongoing discussion about Russian involvement in the U.S. election, have the potential to better account for variation in responses to national threats than nationalism does. This argument does not imply that nationalism does not matter; our argument is consistent with the view that nationalism can be a powerful motivator. Our claim is that nationalist commitments themselves do not predict which policy positions individuals will support as the best means to preserve the long-term survival of their nations. Nationalists' views are affected not only by love of country, but also by their views on domestic politics and international relations. These political views shape their perceptions of how best to defend the nation. Nationalist fervor, we argue, can combine with other political commitments to produce a variety of policies toward how best to respond to foreign threats.

We restrict our investigation to a specific type of foreign intervention: military occupation. By limiting the scope in this way, we set up a hard case for our argument. It is easier to see how domestic politics might shape responses to a more limited intervention, such as the alleged Russian involvement in the 2016 presidential election. In this case, the absence of outrage by Trump partisans may be the result of uncertainty over the extent of Russian involvement or of its effects on the election outcome. Partisans may discount allegations they believe to be politically motivated. In contrast, conquest and occupation by a foreign power is unambiguous. The literature overwhelmingly suggests that the occupation of one nation's territory by the military forces of another nation typically provokes strong nationalist sentiment and encourages costly resistance. In places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the perceived illegitimacy of foreign occupation appears to have encouraged opposition, despite military strategists' efforts to ward off nationalist reactions by using "light footprint" and "hearts and minds" counterinsurgency strategies. If nationalism does not predict and explain resistance to foreign conquest, its ability to explain behav-

ior in contexts in which the nation's independence is less threatened may also require reevaluation.

We assess the impact of nationalism on resistance to occupation through a study of one of the most important occupations of the modern age: the Nazi occupation of France during World War II.⁵ France is the paradigmatic nation and is therefore a critical case. Given the strength of nationalist commitments in prewar France and the preexisting history of conflict between France and Germany, French nationals might have been expected to mobilize *en masse* to resist the German occupation of 1940–44. Yet resistance varied in two puzzling ways. First, it varied over time. We offer a historical analysis to show how the international context affected the timing of resistance in France. Second, participation in the resistance varied systematically across French territory. Using subnational quantitative data, we show that partisan commitments help explain who participated in the French Resistance.

French behavior during World War II illustrates our claim that nationalism is not a monolithic propellant of resistance. Nationalists in France responded to the German occupation by acquiescing, actively collaborating, and resisting. All of these behaviors may be consistent with nationalism. The views of French leaders and French citizens depended not on varying levels of nationalist sentiment, but on their assessment of the domestic and international political climate.

The remainder of this article unfolds as follows. The next section discusses the existing consensus on nationalism and resistance to foreign occupation, calling into question the link between nationalist commitments and political behavior. It addresses two puzzles that remain unaddressed in the literature: varying reactions to military occupation by committed nationalists and active collaboration with foreign conquerors. We then turn to the Nazi occupation of

5. A single case has well-known limitations. For our purposes, it has two crucial advantages. First, a single case facilitates process tracing of historical events, which is particularly useful because our theory requires the evaluation of individuals' public statements and decisionmaking. Specifically, we draw on primary- and secondary-source evidence to assess the role of nationalism in French leaders' statements about the occupation. Second, we use an original dataset to test our hypothesis at the subnational level. On the importance of process-tracing and historical analysis, see David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October 2011), pp. 823–830, doi:10.1017/S1049096511001429; David Collier, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright, "Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology," in Brady and Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), pp. 161–199; John Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2 (May 2004), pp. 341–354, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4145316>; James Mahoney, "After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research," *World Politics*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 120–147, doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109990220; and Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).

France to illustrate the political determinants of national resistance. We conclude by discussing the implications of our argument for other cases, for theory, and for policymaking.

Nationalism and Foreign Occupation

Over the past three decades, scholars of nationalism have largely converged around an understanding of nationalism as a principle of political legitimacy that assigns collective self-determination to nations. To paraphrase Ernest Gellner, nationalism is the political principle that the boundaries of the political community and those of the nation should coincide.⁶ Nations comprise fairly large numbers of individuals who “imagine” themselves to be, and are accepted by others, as properly sovereign groups.⁷ Although each nation is associated with a specific story (often substantially embellished) that is taken to ground its legitimacy, there is no single type of attribute that distinguishes nations from each other. In spite of resemblances to some forms of premodern political solidarity, nations and nationalism are fundamentally modern. Moreover, nationalism is globally hegemonic: the majority of people living today understand themselves to be members of nations, and few question the principle of national self-determination. One implication of this scholarly consensus is that political domination by those perceived as foreign is deeply inconsistent with a nationalist view of political legitimacy.

Scholars who have used nationalism as a causal variable to explain the behavior of people living under military occupation have formulated hypotheses based on the logic of self-determination at the core of nationalist thinking.⁸ Nationalism is expected to encourage rebellion against, and discourage collaboration with, an occupier.⁹ David Edelstein argues that the logic driving na-

6. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1.

7. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

8. For an overview of causal predictions, see Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.”

9. See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 201; Peter Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 4; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 148; Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards”; William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), pp. xiii–xiv; David M. Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008); and Keith A. Darden, “Resisting Occupation: Mass Schooling and the Creation of Durable National Loyalties,” *American University*, 2011. On nationalism and U.S. failure in Vietnam, see Ivan Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 12; and Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), p. 183, doi:10.2307/

tionalist individuals toward resistance and away from collaboration makes nationalism “the greatest impediment to successful military occupation”:¹⁰ “Military occupation is a particular affront to any occupied population’s nationalism. If any event is likely to generate a strong nationalist response, then it is likely to be the usurpation of political authority by a foreign occupying power that has just defeated the occupied population in war.”¹¹

Analyzing the causes of insurgency against occupying powers, Keith Darden argues that nationalist populations will mount insurgencies against foreign powers attempting to establish control over them, assuming favorable terrain and other facilitating conditions.¹² He writes, “Nationalism, as a strong identification with a collective entity more important than any individual members, induces a different type of rational calculus: one that justifies self-sacrifice and stigmatizes selfish material motives if they come at the expense of national goals.”¹³ Here, Darden emphasizes both the importance of the nation’s collective identity over individual self-interest and the willingness of nationalists to make sacrifices. Similarly, explaining why occupied populations resort to suicide terrorism, Robert Pape finds that “the prospect of the homeland being occupied and ruled by foreigners usually constitutes an especially severe provocation to nationalist sentiments.”¹⁴ Even when the balance of

2009880. On nationalism and U.S. failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Daniel Byman, “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?” *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (December 2008), p. 608, doi:10.1080/09636410802507974; Andrew J. Enterline and J. Michael Greig, “Perfect Storms? Political Instability in Imposed Polities and the Futures of Iraq and Afghanistan,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 52, No. 6 (December 2008), p. 885, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27638644>; and Jon Lindsay and Roger Petersen, “Varieties of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2003–2009,” Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups Case Study Series (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, 2012), p. 61, <http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/10>. For a review of recent work on U.S. attempts at foreign occupation and nation building, see Jason Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build?” *World Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (January 2007), pp. 314–340, doi:10.1353/wp.2007.0019.

10. Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards*, p. 10. In “Occupational Hazards,” Edelstein recommends that states avoid occupation altogether (p. 83). He argues that nationalism can be overcome and occupation can succeed only in limited circumstances: if the occupied population recognizes the need for the occupation, if the occupying power provides credible guarantees that it will eventually withdraw, and if an external threat is commonly perceived by both occupier and occupied. See *ibid.*, pp. 58, 61; and Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards*, pp. 23, 154. Additionally, the occupier must provide abundant services to the occupied population. See Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards,” p. 74; Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards*, p. 51; and Barry R. Posen, “A Grand Strategy of Restraint,” in Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, eds., *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2008), p. 100. While we disagree with Edelstein’s claims about nationalism, we agree with his position on the significance of the international balance of power in accounting for occupation outcomes. We suggest that elements of Edelstein’s argument are more widely applicable than is appreciated.

11. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards,” p. 11.

12. Darden, *Resisting Occupation*, pp. 74–79.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

14. Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 84.

power highly favors the occupiers, as in the cases Pape examines, citizens of nation-states are expected to display a reluctance to concede defeat, a willingness to use extreme tactics to oppose an occupation, and a strong aversion to cooperating with foreign conquerors.

Nationalism is rarely the sole cause of conflict in these accounts; scholars also point to other factors to explain outcomes. Our point is not that nationalism is posited as the primary cause of resistance, but that existing theories agree on the direction of the effect: nationalism exacerbates conflict between nations, prompting resistance to foreign powers that attempt to attack and occupy a nation's territory.

These arguments are underpinned by two assumptions about the way national identity affects individual and group behavior. First, the literature assumes that, for the general population and maybe even for elites, nationalism is a strong source of identity that trumps competing commitments. When the nation is threatened, nationalists prioritize its protection, often sacrificing other political goals and even their own self-interest.¹⁵ Second, the literature sees nationalism as a unifying ideology. Because nationalism supersedes other political commitments, it should produce a desire to defend the nation that is shared by individuals who would otherwise be divided by ethnic, religious, or left-right political cleavages.¹⁶

These two assumptions lead to the expectation that nationalists will come together and resist the foreign occupation of their homeland. Existing accounts do not envision variation among nationalists in their preferred response to military occupation. A nationalist population should not actively collaborate

15. Historian Keith L. Nelson represents an exception to this view. Writing about the brief Allied occupation of Germany in the aftermath of World War I, he reports that U.S. troops had "anticipated meeting a spirit of nationalism, but such feelings apparently had vanished . . . the occupation of the cities [in late 1918] proceeded with no special problems." Nelson, *Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918–1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 33–35. This view is not without problems, however. Nelson assumes that nationalism would, if unhindered by other factors, have produced resistance and that, therefore, something else must have prevented nationalism from exercising its violence-prone role. Never does he investigate whether the cooperation of the occupied German people might have been the result of nationalist considerations, such as ensuring the survival of the German nation in the immediate aftermath of World War I. For another exception that argues that the Chinese leadership has prioritized economic goals over nationalist ones and that the threat of Chinese nationalism has been overstated, see Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 114–146, doi:10.1162/isec.23.3.114. Downs and Strecker, too, see nationalism as a force for instability, but suggest that it was overridden by economic goals.

16. H. Zeynep Bulutgil points to an exception: when the foreign power has allied with an ethnic group within the state, that group may be viewed with suspicion and subjected to ethnic cleansing. See Bulutgil, "War, Collaboration, and Endogenous Ethnic Polarization: The Path to Ethnic Cleansing," in Erica Chenoweth and Adria K. Lawrence, eds., *Rethinking Violence: States and Non-state Actors in Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010), pp. 57–82.

with a foreign occupier.¹⁷ These predictions follow intuitively from the standard definition of nationalism provided by Gellner. They reflect an understanding of behavior as a straightforward consequence of national identity: a commitment to the nation and its freedom predisposes nationalists to resist.

DISUNITY AND DISAGREEMENT AMONG NATIONALISTS

Drawing on scholarly work on nationalism that questions the link between shared national identity and political behavior, we challenge both the assumption that shared national identity unifies the nation against threats and the assumption that nationalism trumps other political commitments.¹⁸ By definition, nationalists agree on the nation's right to self-determination and the odiousness of foreign domination. This agreement, however, does not produce a consensus about what to do to defend these principles.¹⁹ Nationalists can and do disagree both about what is best for their nation and about how to achieve it. Contentious politics and violence may divide conationals even in the midst of struggles against foreign occupiers.²⁰ This subnational fragmentation is compatible with an authentic commitment to the nation by all parties.

The ideology of nationalism itself does not dictate specific actions or policies; it is a general principle about the nation's right to exist. Some scholars of nationalism have described it as an "empty" ideology, or, as Rogers Brubaker put it, a "precarious frame of vision and basis for individual and collective action."²¹ Given that no particular course of action follows from the principle of nationalism, it can be reconciled with a wide variety of political programs, choices, and behaviors. For instance, scholars have shown that leaders may use nationalist rhetoric to distract citizens from focusing on domestic cleav-

17. Some scholars suggest that, in exceptional circumstances, an occupation may not provoke widespread resistance. We identify four such circumstances: the population of the occupied territory may be insufficiently nationalistic; ruthless repression may eliminate opportunities to rebel; if the occupation is very lenient, there may be no reason for rebellion; and, finally, acquiescence is likely if the occupier and the occupied face a common threat. See Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards," pp. 61–65. An occupied nation may be forced to tolerate an occupation, but nationalists should not actively collaborate with the occupier.

18. On this point, see Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 9; and Adria K. Lawrence, *Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism: Anti-colonial Protest in the French Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 10–13.

19. See Arnold Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (December 1952), pp. 481–502.

20. Adria K. Lawrence, "Triggering Nationalist Violence: Competition and Conflict in Uprisings against Colonial Rule," *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 88–122, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00019.

21. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1996), pp. 9–10. See also Calvert W. Jones, *Bedouins into Bourgeois: Remaking Citizens for Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

ages, to increase leverage in diplomatic negotiations, and to justify either the exclusion or inclusion of minority groups.²² The instrumental appropriation of nationalism by elites for diverse aims points to the flexibility of nationalism, but it does not imply that nationalist commitments are “banal,” to use John Mueller’s term.²³ Sincere, deeply felt expressions of nationalism can be wedded to different political platforms.²⁴ Our claim is not that individuals prioritize other commitments over the nation. Rather, we argue that it is not necessary for nationalists to prioritize the nation over their other aims, because nationalist commitments can be reconciled with other political goals.

The expectations that follow from this discussion diverge from the view that nationalism encourages resistance to foreign occupation. We argue that the range of possible behaviors that a nationalist may implement in the presence of a foreign military occupation is broader than the literature postulates. Rather than subordinating other goals to the demands of nationalism, we expect political actors to emphasize the consistency of their partisan, religious, ethnic, or economic agendas with the welfare of the nation. We thus expect to observe variation in behavior by committed nationalists.²⁵ Existing arguments in the literature are unable to account for variation in behavior among nationalists facing the same set of circumstances. We argue that this variation can be understood through studying individuals’ partisan commitments, domestic agendas, and views about current affairs.

22. See V.P. Gagnon Jr., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 130–166, doi:10.2307/2539081; Jessica Chen Weiss, *Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); and Harris Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). In a similar vein, Fotini Christia shows that armed groups in multisided civil wars retrospectively justify instrumentally chosen alliances in terms of ethnic or religious commonality or difference. See Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

23. John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War,’” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 42–70, doi:10.1162/016228800560381.

24. Ashutosh Varshney points out that “[f]or something to be manipulated by a leader when death, injury, or incarceration is a clear possibility, it must be valued as a good by a critical mass of people,” suggesting that masses are not duped by elites, but can be genuinely motivated to take action when persuaded that the nation is at risk. See Varshney, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality,” *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2003), p. 89, doi:10.1017/S1537592703000069.

25. We set aside the question of whether nationalists are more likely to resist than are individuals with no national identity; our focus is on explaining variation within a nationalist population. If we were to compare a nationalist to a nonnationalist, all else equal, we might expect the former to resist more often than the latter, although a person does not need to be a nationalist to resist foreign conquest, as work on colonial conquest suggests. See Paul MacDonald, *Networks of Domination: The Social Foundations of Peripheral Conquest in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

COLLABORATION UNDER FOREIGN OCCUPATION

Challenging the literature's assumptions also enables us to address the puzzle of collaboration. Scholars of international relations have underemphasized the occurrence of collaboration, in part because the expectation that the occupied population will behave along the acquiescence-resistance continuum makes no room for an analysis of behavior beyond that spectrum. Collaboration is not the suppression of resistance. It is not passive acquiescence. Collaboration is the active pursuit of objectives shared by the occupied and the occupier or even driven by the occupied under the protection of the occupier. Collaboration may be entirely pragmatic and is consistent with a variety of motivations; it need not, though it may, involve allegiance to the occupier or support for its ultimate goals.²⁶ Our purpose is to highlight how nationalism is compatible with, and may indeed be a motivation for, collaboration.

Collaborators are often reviled for putting their individual benefit ahead of the national interest. Although crass opportunism undoubtedly plays an important role in inducing collaboration, we focus on two additional motivations: domestic cleavages and nationalism. Military occupiers are powerful actors in the domestic politics of the occupied state. By allying with them, political parties and factions can advance their interests vis-à-vis domestic rivals. Especially for previously less powerful factions, military occupation creates incentives to leverage the occupier's power for domestic advantage by offering willing collaboration.

The parties or factions whose interests are undermined in the collaborator's bargain are more likely to become important agents of resistance. Under these circumstances, violent resistance to the occupation does double duty as factional political violence. Thus, instead of fostering unified resistance among fellow nationalists, military occupation may aggravate and militarize existing domestic cleavages.²⁷

Granted, collaboration with a foreign occupier may produce a nationalist

26. On collaboration in civil wars, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 91–110. On how behavioral collaboration and ideologically motivated collaborationism are distinct, see Stanley Hoffman, "Collaborationism in France during World War II," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (September 1968), pp. 375–395, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1878146>.

27. Collaboration with military occupiers can be thought of as a form of "ethnic defection," in which people sometimes fight on the "wrong" side in civil wars, against their co-ethnics. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 8 (2008), pp. 1043–1068, doi:10.1177/0010414008317949; Paul Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-state Paramilitaries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (February 2012), pp. 16–40, doi:10.1177/0022002711429681; and Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?" *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 7–40, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00087.

backlash. Yet nationalism is also an ideological resource for collaborators, who can conceptualize their domestic rivals—that is, those who wish to resist the foreign occupation—as internal threats to the nation on par with, or even more dangerous than, external threats. Although drawing on nationalism to attack one’s conationals in alliance with foreigners has the odor of bad faith, the evocation of nationalism in such situations need not be insincere or unrealistic. Domestic rivals may be criticized for risking the nation’s future to attain political gains, whereas collaboration can be defended as a way to ensure regaining the nation’s sovereignty in the long term.²⁸ Building a strong, cooperative relationship with the occupier can help end the occupation more quickly, lower its costs to the occupied population, check internal threats to the nation, and make the nation-state more secure in the future. Although dogged resistance may, under some conditions, represent the best way to advance the nation’s interests, under other conditions, nationalists may advise restraint, appeasement, or collaboration as the best way to ensure the nation’s future survival. Nationalism is consistent with both sets of responses: it can operate as an independent, sincere motivation for collaboration and resistance.

The next section looks at the German occupation of France from 1940 to 1944 through the prism of our theory. France is arguably the birthplace of nationalism and is universally regarded as among the first countries to develop a unified national identity.²⁹ It thus provides a useful case for studying variation within a nationalist population. It also provides an opportunity to consider alternative explanations for resistance and collaboration under military occupation.

Nationalism and the Nazi Occupation of France

On June 22, 1940, the final government of the Third French Republic concluded an armistice with Nazi Germany. In addition to an immediate cessation

28. This argument complements Edelstein’s “balancing” argument, which anticipates collaboration when the occupier can protect the occupied nation from threats that are more dangerous than the occupier itself. See Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards*, pp. 22–24.

29. See Éric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and William H. Sewell Jr., “The French Revolution and the Emergence of the Nation Form,” in Michael Morrison and Melinda Zook, eds., *Revolutionary Currents: Nation Building in the Transatlantic World* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), pp. 91–125. On the debate concerning the origins of modern nationalism, see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Steven Pincus, “Nationalism, Universal Monarchy, and the Glorious Revolution,” in George Steinmetz, ed., *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 182–210; Philip S. Gorski, “The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist Theories of Nationalism,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 105, No. 5 (March 2000), pp. 1428–1468, doi:10.1086/210435; and Anthony W. Marx, *Faith in Nation*:

of hostilities, the armistice acceded to German occupation of three-fifths of French territory, committed France to reimburse Germany for its occupation costs (400 million francs a day), required the disarmament and demobilization of most of France's armed forces, and enjoined the French government to prevent resistance against Germany throughout its metropolitan and imperial territories.³⁰ In the words of Marshal Philippe Pétain, appointed prime minister of France on June 16, 1940, the government accepted defeat because "the military situation dictated it."³¹ For the next four years, Pétain, France's most famous World War I hero, led his country down the "path of collaboration" with the Nazi occupiers.³²

Yet, only hours after Pétain's government concluded armistice negotiations, Gen. Charles de Gaulle rejected the government's rationale. Addressing the French nation from London via BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) Radio, de Gaulle called upon French civilians and military personnel to rally wherever they could and continue to resist in the cause of eventual military victory.³³

The dramatically divergent wartime trajectories of de Gaulle and Pétain are emblematic of the difficult choices the French people faced during the "dark years" of 1940–44. Responses varied from the outright enthusiasm for Nazism displayed by the "fascist gangs and writers of Paris" to mere acquiescence to the dogged resistance, from July 1941 on, of the French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français, or PCF).³⁴ Yet the overall arc of French behavior during World War II is fairly straightforward: France was largely unified in collaboration with the German occupation for several years. French elites participated in or actively supported collaboration that went far beyond the basic

Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). None of these authors, however, would dispute the full consolidation of nationalism by the early twentieth century.

30. According to Edelstein's definition in *Occupational Hazards*, none of the Axis invasions in World War II count as military occupations, because the invader intended them to be permanent; their impermanence is known only after the fact. For our purposes, the intentions of the invader are not as relevant as whether those in the conquered country accepted the occupation as permanent. We show that the French leadership was not resigned to permanent annexation; both the Vichy leaders and resistance leaders hoped France's sovereignty would be restored.

31. In his June 20, 1940, speech, Pétain stated, "J'ai pris cette décision, dure au cœur d'un soldat, parce que la situation militaire l'imposait." Philippe Pétain, *Discours aux Français 17 juin 1940–20 août 1944* (Speeches to the French, June 17, 1940–August 20, 1944), Jean-Claude Barbas, ed. (Paris: Albin Michel, 1989), p. 59.

32. The choice of the term "collaboration" was Pétain's, in his speech to the French nation on October 30, 1940, "J'entre aujourd'hui dans la voie de la collaboration." *Ibid.*, p. 95.

33. See Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs*, Vol. 1: *The Call to Honour, 1940–1942* (New York: Viking, 1955).

34. For a discussion of the "Fascist gangs and writers of Paris," see Hoffmann, "Collaborationism in France during World War II," p. 375. Hoffmann describes them as "a noisy but tiny, repulsive but insignificant, minority."

administrative cooperation carried out by other German-occupied states of Western Europe.³⁵ The functionaries of the French state overwhelmingly assisted in the execution of the regime's program. Indeed, Robert Paxton and Eberhard Jäckel have demonstrated that members of the Vichy government sought more extensive collaboration than Germany envisioned.³⁶ Few French citizens responded to de Gaulle's appeal early in the war.

External resistance to the Germans eventually coalesced with massive support from the British and Americans. Internal armed resistance was anemic until 1943 and became widespread only as liberation approached. The French Resistance on its own was never a serious threat to German rule and played only a minor, supporting role as the Allies evicted Axis forces from French territory.

The history of collaboration and resistance in France raises three puzzling questions. First, why was collaboration with, or at least acquiescence toward, the German occupiers the dominant French response during the war? Second, what explains variation in French responses to occupation? In other words, why did some collaborate while others resisted? Finally, can nationalism help us account for this variation?

In this section, we begin by evaluating three possible explanations for widespread collaboration that would not undermine existing arguments on the role of nationalism. First, the French may not have been nationalistic enough to rebel against the German occupation. If the French nation was not a priority for Pétain and the Vichy leadership, or if the French population in general was insufficiently imbued with nationalism, widespread collaboration is less puzzling. Second, although nationalism produced the impulse to resist, German repression may have been so ruthless and effective that there were few opportunities for armed resistance. Third, German policies might have been benevolent enough to dampen the impulse to resist.

After considering these three alternative explanations, we demonstrate that the French leadership's decision to collaborate was driven by two factors: its

35. Philip Nord writes, "The French government did not take the path of exile but transformed itself, step by step, into an authoritarian and collaborationist regime, Vichy. This was a unique outcome." Nord, *France, 1940: Defending the Republic* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2015), p. xvii. The Dutch, Belgian, and Norwegian governments went into exile in one form or another, while the Danish government remained a constitutional monarchy throughout the war. For a comparative overview, see Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 134–136.

36. Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944*, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); and Eberhard Jäckel, *La France dans l'Europe de Hitler* (France in Hitler's Europe) (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1968). To give an example, in July 1940 (and without any instructions from the Germans), Vichy passed a series of discriminatory laws aimed at Jews, particularly Jews who were not French citizens.

reading of the European balance of power in 1940 and the opportunity presented by the occupation to reverse the electoral gains of the French Left under the Third Republic. Both rationales could be (and were) reconciled discursively with the aim of preserving France as a nation. We show how this argument accounts for the predominantly left-wing composition of the French Resistance. Contrary to what the literature would predict, patterns of collaboration and resistance cannot be explained by a patriotic commitment to the French nation, which was shared among collaborators and the Resistance.

Subsequent patterns of French collaboration and resistance reflect the evolution of both domestic and international political competition. As the war changed the European balance of power, the prospect of German defeat made the Resistance more credible, attracting further adherents. Domestically, the withering likelihood of a German victory undermined the legitimacy of the Vichy regime, further augmenting the ranks of the Resistance. Opposition became widespread only when liberation was imminent.

COLLABORATION AND INSUFFICIENT NATIONALISM

The Vichy regime and the various strands of the Resistance all presented themselves as French patriots. For the members of the Resistance, this is not a surprising claim; it follows from the predictions of the literature that they would employ the discourse of nationalism. We therefore devote no space to establishing it, except to note that even the PCF, a pro-Soviet and ideologically internationalist party, articulated its participation in the Resistance in (partially) nationalist terms.³⁷

It is the Vichy regime's nationalism that is more remarkable, particularly Pétain's counterintuitive view that the French nation could be saved only by capitulating to German aggression. Vichy portrayed itself as an apolitical government of national unity, tasked with protecting the French people and rebuilding the nation in the aftermath of defeat. Building on a widely shared interwar narrative of French social and political decadence, Pétain blamed France's military catastrophe on "the weaknesses and flaws of the prior political regime."³⁸ Commercial interests, unions, and career politicians—this narrative went—focused on the narrow contest for power within the dysfunctional structures of the Third Republic, disregarded the national interest, and pro-

37. See H.R. Kedward, *Resistance in Vichy France: A Study of Ideas and Motivation in the Southern Zone, 1940–1942* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 133–134. Kedward argues that patriotism was a central motivation for members of the Resistance, but, anticipating our argument, he notes, "[Patriotism] in 1940 was the justification for many points of view, not least support for Pétain." *Ibid.*, p. 78.

38. Pétain, *Discours aux Français*, p. 86.

duced incoherent policies that left France vulnerable to its enemies. The character of the *ancien régime* was believed both to reflect and to help aggravate a deeper cultural malaise in the grip of which the French people had lost sight of their fundamental values.³⁹

The Vichy government therefore quickly announced the Révolution Nationale, or National Revolution. Inaugurated by Pétain in his speech of October 10, 1940, this program aimed at reconstituting France on a solid foundation of energetic authoritarian government; corporatist labor-capital relations; and the traditional values of work, family, and fatherland—a trinity that replaced “liberty, equality, and fraternity” as the motto of the state under Vichy.⁴⁰ In J.G. Shields’s words, “The National Revolution . . . was to restore order and greatness to France, promoting national unity to the detriment of individualism, authority to that of liberalism, hierarchy to that of equality.”⁴¹

The collaborationist Vichy regime thus saw itself as the standard-bearer of the National Revolution in France, even as it pursued deeper collaboration with a foreign military occupation. Public displays of patriotism were mainstays of the regime: “Busts of Pétain were supposed to replace Marianne [a national symbol of the French Republic] in the town halls, but the tricolour flag was retained, as was the Marseillaise [as the French national anthem]. Rarely had the Marseillaise been more sung as the regime desperately attempted to cling on to the symbols of French patriotism.”⁴² Paxton writes of the Vichy-era Army of the Armistice: “Its units took on a busy ceremonial life in the towns and villages of the Unoccupied Zone in order to display the physical evidences of patriotism.”⁴³

Vichy’s national imagery combined change with continuity, highlighting different elements in the French historical pantheon from those emphasized by the prior Republic. The cult of Jeanne d’Arc (who fought the English) was promoted; the Gallic rebel Vercingetorix (who fought the Romans) was the center-

39. The belief that social and political decadence caused France’s defeat was widely shared at the time, even by martyrs of the Resistance such as Marc Bloch, and it has deeply influenced scholarly understandings of the Battle of France. See Bloch, *Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), pp. 126–176. For a persuasive debunking, see Julian Jackson, *The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Paxton also points out that hostility to the Third Republic extended even to enemies of Vichy such as Léon Blum and Charles de Gaulle. See Paxton, *Vichy France*, p. 138.

40. On Pétain’s interwar political views, including an ample testament to his patriotism that is derived principally from private letters and public speeches of the period, see Richard M. Griffiths, *Marshal Pétain* (London: Constable, 1970), chap. 5.

41. J.G. Shields, *The Extreme Right in France: From Pétain to Le Pen* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 22–23.

42. Jackson, *France*, p. 154.

43. Robert O. Paxton, *Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Pétain* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 172.

piece of a major state-organized celebration in 1941.⁴⁴ Both historical figures could be symbolically deployed to stress the value of fighting for France while downplaying Germany as a national enemy.

The classic definition of nationalism we rely on, however, goes beyond simple patriotic devotion, which need not imply a commitment to sovereign peoplehood. A person could be, for instance, a Bavarian or Texan patriot, without imagining Bavaria or Texas as a sovereign nation. Is it possible that the leaders of Vichy imagined the future of a defeated France in this way, as a beloved region of a future German state?

On the contrary, the Vichy historiography stresses that it was precisely a concern for sovereignty that drove official collaboration forward. Mark Mazower describes collaboration as “an effort to preserve French autonomy and sovereignty in the face of overwhelming German power,” and states further that “Vichy’s politicians were French nationalists, gambling on whether German National Socialism was prepared to trust them sufficiently to grant them the power they sought.”⁴⁵ The key to understanding how nationalism could produce a policy of collaboration is to recognize that the Vichy leadership wanted a peace treaty and normalization with Germany, “a broad Franco-German settlement,” as Paxton puts it. Collaboration was thus “not a German demand to which some Frenchmen acceded,” but “a French proposal that [Chancellor Adolf] Hitler ultimately rejected.”⁴⁶ Given the magnitude of France’s defeat in 1940 and the reality of German military preponderance on the European continent, the Vichy government believed that seeking an accommodation with Germany was the only realistic short-term pathway to the restoration of French sovereignty during the early years of the war.

In his October 1940 talks with Hitler at Montoire, Pétain indicated that France would be willing to assist the German war effort against Great Britain and pointed to the steps the Vichy government had already taken to demonstrate its support of Germany, including condemning de Gaulle to death and defending Dakar against an Allied attack in September.⁴⁷ Pétain made it plain that his reasons for collaboration were nationalist in nature: he concluded his

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 114–115. Vichy’s colonial and Mediterranean focus in foreign affairs led the regime to cast Britain and Italy as its principal international rivals.

45. See Mark Mazower, *Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (New York: Penguin, 2008), pp. 418–419.

46. Paxton, *Vichy France*, p. 51. See also Mazower, *Hitler’s Empire*, pp. 421–422.

47. The Battle of Dakar was a three-day engagement between troops and ships loyal to Vichy and a British naval task force ferrying 8,000 British and Free French troops. Vichy forces successfully repelled a landing attempt and severely damaged a British cruiser. The Allied defeat at Dakar demonstrated the resolve of Vichy France to defend its colonial possessions, even if it required firing on French and British forces.

remarks by saying that he would do all he could to assure that France would retain its territories.⁴⁸ Pétain's position was clear: Vichy should do what was necessary to gain German support for the restoration of French sovereignty and the retention of French colonies.

Contemporaneous evidence suggests that most French citizens—including even some leaders of the nascent Resistance—accepted Pétain as a genuine patriot, acting in the best interests of France's sovereignty. For instance, one of the earliest leaders of the Resistance, Henri Frenay, wrote in 1940: "We are passionately attached to the work of Marshal Pétain."⁴⁹ Even the Resistance newspaper *Défense de la France* interpreted Pétain's policies as patriotic. The editor, Philippe Viannay, wrote as late as January 1942: "The marshal does nothing other than continue what he has always done: resist and safeguard the interests of France."⁵⁰ Pétain and, to a lesser extent, the Vichy regime as a whole, did not lack for apologists even during the initial decades after the war. The dominant historical interpretation during this period was that the regime had acted as a "shield," defending the French from the worst excesses of the occupation.⁵¹ Thus, according to the Vichy regime's claims and observers of the occupation era, Pétain and the collaborating regime were bona fide French nationalists.

Beyond the use of nationalist rhetoric by the Vichy regime and the nationalist logic of its commitment to the policy of collaboration, an evaluation of the role of nationalism in affecting the choice to resist or collaborate with the Germans requires measuring allegiance across the French population. To avoid the bias of hindsight, the best way to code nationalism among a given population in a systematic way is to look for an exogenous and temporally anterior process that reliably generates national identity.

Darden proposes a candidate for an exogenous cause of nationalism in compulsory education.⁵² He suggests that scholars treat communities of people the

48. Jäckel, *La France dans L'Europe de Hitler*, p. 173.

49. Quoted in Jackson, *France*, p. 3.

50. "Le Maréchal ne fait que continuer ce qu'il toujours fait: résister, sauvegarder les intérêts français." Olivier Wieviorka, *Une certaine idée de la Résistance: Défense de la France, 1940–1949* (A particular idea of Resistance: the defense of France, 1940–1949) (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1995), p. 43.

51. Paxton, *Vichy France*, pp. xi–xv.

52. Darden, *Resisting Occupation*, chap. 2. Scholars of nationalism largely agree on the key role of education and literacy in fostering national identity. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1953); Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976); Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; and Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe," in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 60–78.

majority of whom have become literate in a curriculum with substantial nationalist content as presumptively nationalist.⁵³ According to this logic, majority unschooled communities or those schooled in a curriculum lacking in nationalist content should be treated as nonnationalist.

Using this measurement, we treat the French population of 1940 as uniformly nationalistic. Free and compulsory public education was introduced in France with a series of laws passed from 1881 to 1889; during the same period, funding for public instruction grew massively.⁵⁴ The content of French education was nationalistic and intensely anti-German.⁵⁵ As early as 1901, the French census reported only 17.4 percent of the population as illiterate; not a single French department had a rate of illiteracy of more than 41 percent.⁵⁶ By 1940, the overwhelming majority of French citizens had been raised by parents educated in a nationalist curriculum and were themselves educated in such a curriculum.

Another important institution that scholars have identified as crucial to promoting nationalist consciousness is compulsory military service. On this indicator, France also should be treated as uniformly nationalistic: all young, able-bodied Frenchmen served a period in the active-duty armed forces and continued in the reserves for years afterward.⁵⁷ From 1866 through the end of World War II, Prussia-cum-Germany was the principal threat to French sovereignty. Fighting Germany was thus the central purpose of the French army for more than seventy years.

Yet the French military itself played a central role in the Vichy government. Some of France's highest-ranking officers, including Marshal Pétain, Adm. François Darlan, Gen. Maxime Weygand, and Gen. Charles-Léon Huntziger, took major political positions in the regime. Generals dominated key posts in Pétain's cabinet and formed the core of his informal advisory group. Officers

53. Darden sets a community-level threshold of 50 percent literacy: once a community passes this mark, he treats it as irreversibly nationalistic. *Ibid.*, pp. 56–57.

54. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, pp. 308–309; and Roger Price, *A Social History of Nineteenth Century France* (London: Hutchinson, 1987), pp. 316–317.

55. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, pp. 332–338; Price, *A Social History*, p. 356; Jonathan French Scott, *Patriots in the Making: What America Can Learn from France and Germany* (New York: D. Appleton, 1916); Jonathan French Scott, *The Menace of Nationalism in Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1927); and Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," pp. 112–113.

56. *République française, service du recensement, Résultats statistique du recensement Générale de la population effectué le 24 mars 1901* (Statistical results of the general census of the population carried out March 24, 1901), 5 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1904). Departments are the first-level administrative and territorial divisions of France.

57. The Third Republic introduced compulsory military service with an active term of five years and eliminated substitution via the military law of July 27, 1872. See Scott, *Patriots in the Making*, p. 226. On the eve of World War I, France was Europe's "most militarized society—in the sense of the proportion of the population under arms." Eighty-five percent of its military-aged male population was trained for war. See Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War: Explaining World War I* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), pp. 93–95.

were also appointed to many posts in the civil administration.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the Armistice Army, the small force permitted by the Franco-German armistice, was a pillar of the regime. Pétain decided to create the Légion Française des Combattants, for French World War I veterans and use it in lieu of a political party as the sole mass intermediary between the regime and the people.⁵⁹ The leadership of the collaborationist paramilitary group known as the Milice came mainly from the membership of the Légion.⁶⁰

At the individual level, therefore, nationalism in World War II France should be treated as effectively constant. According to the two most widely accepted indicators of nationalist inculcation—compulsory mass education and military service—the French were nationalists long before 1940. In fact, compulsory education and universal conscription were central institutions in the formation of a national identity that is often treated as the apotheosis of its kind. By the start of World War I, at the latest, a number of social, political, economic, and demographic processes had converged to transform the distinctive regions of France into a literate, patriotic, and overwhelmingly French-speaking people.⁶¹ In 1914–18, French citizens from all regions, classes, and professions demonstrated an extraordinary willingness to sacrifice on behalf of their nation.⁶²

A mere generation later, the overwhelming majority of French citizens declined to resist a humiliating occupation, while much of the elite actively collaborated with the occupiers. Thus, an exogenous, structural account of nationalism fails to explain the scale of collaboration, its composition, and its variation over time. National identity did not produce resistance, but was instead consistent with both resistance and collaboration. French actors justified compliance with the German occupation by affirming their love for the nation and their desire for its endurance.

COLLABORATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR RESISTANCE

If the French population of 1940 was highly nationalistic, perhaps its striking lack of resistance can be explained by a simple lack of opportunity. Was the

58. Paxton, *Parades and Politics at Vichy*, pp. 146–152.

59. Jackson, *France*, p. 144.

60. See Philippe Burrin, *France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise* (New York: New Press, 1996), pp. 437–440.

61. A generation of scholars dated French unity as a nation to the 1789 Revolution, whereas others, including Weber, see the consolidation of the nation occurring between 1870 and 1914, when the Third Republic further developed roads and railways, and introduced new laws of mandatory military service and universal primary schooling. See Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*; and Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 7–8. In a speech in March 1882, the French scholar Ernest Renan affirmed France's "full national existence such as we see it blossoming today." Renan, "What Is a Nation?" in Eley and Suny, *Becoming National: A Reader*, p. 44.

62. During the Battle of France in 1940, the French suffered 92,000 fatalities at the hands of invading German forces—less than 7 percent of French losses during World War I.

German occupation so effective that it stifled all chance for resistance?⁶³ Repression did play an important role in limiting the opportunity for resistance. Two pieces of evidence, however, undermine the claim that resistance was not feasible after the fall of France. First, neither the French nor the German leadership at the time thought resistance was foreclosed; there was significant disagreement on both sides about whether France would collaborate or resist. Second, it was principally the French government, not the German occupiers, that kept the Resistance in check. The French government repeatedly declined to resist German aggression, even as its sovereignty and freedom of action were steadily whittled away. Instead, Vichy used its own formidable repressive capacities to thwart attempts at resistance by French citizens.

The initial opportunity for resistance arose as the Battle of France was winding down. The government of Paul Reynaud vigorously debated continuing to fight Germany from the empire. France had two crucial assets that would survive a total defeat in metropolitan France: a powerful surface fleet that would have made it extremely difficult for Germany and Italy to wage war effectively in North Africa, and colonies from which fresh armies could be mobilized. A unified French government in the empire, allied to Britain, would have been a formidable obstacle to Axis domination of Southern Europe. Moreover, a continuing war with the French Empire would have tied down far more German troops in the occupation of France than was actually the case, both for the maintenance of internal order and to defend the Mediterranean coastline. Meeting with Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini on June 17, 1940, Hitler explained his rationale for the lenient armistice proposal he planned to offer France in precisely these terms, rejecting Mussolini's territorial ambitions in the Mediterranean.⁶⁴

Pétain's intervention appears to have been decisive not only to the government's decision to sound the Germans out on armistice terms, but also in the resignation of the pro-resistance Prime Minister Reynaud. Pétain argued that the government's responsibility was to remain in France to safeguard the French people and state to the best of its ability, rather than to depend on foreign armies to restore it to power.⁶⁵ The German armistice terms were harsh but offered valuable concessions to French interests. Two-fifths of the territory

63. Peter Liberman argues that "nationalism and other aspects of modernization" created "a great potential for widespread resistance" in occupied Europe, but this potential was thwarted by "ruthless invaders." Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?* p. 146. For a similar argument, see Alexander Weisiger, "Victory without Peace: Conquest, Insurgency, and War Termination," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (September 2014), pp. 357–382, doi:10.1177/0738894213508691.

64. Paxton, *Vichy France*, p. 7.

65. Jackson, *France*, p. 123.

of France would remain unoccupied; the fleet and the empire would stay in French hands; France would be permitted a 100,000-man army based mainly in the empire; and the French government would continue to administer its territories outside of Europe. Internal security forces (police, gendarmerie, etc.) and the civilian administration were not affected by the armistice, except insofar as they were expected to conform to German dictates in the occupied zone.

Three distinct policy positions emerged among the members of the Vichy leadership during the first months of the occupation. The first was minimal acquiescence to the conditions of the armistice until such time as France could rejoin Britain, or even the United States, in the war. General Weygand articulated this view, which many in France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared. Weygand was convinced that Germany had not yet won the war; accordingly, he advocated pushing back against German demands and preparing to rejoin the Allies.⁶⁶ In contrast, Pétain's initial position was neutrality: if possible, he wanted to negotiate with Britain and Germany at the same time; he even hoped to act as an intermediary between them.⁶⁷ Pierre Laval, the vice prime minister of the Vichy government, took the third and most pro-collaborationist position. He was convinced that Britain would lose the war and Germany would dominate Europe. He thought France should seek to occupy an honorable, though perhaps subordinate, position in the new Europe that was to come.⁶⁸

This range of views suggests that there was more than one option for the French government as the occupation began. Collaboration was not dictated by German strength: it was chosen by leaders making uncertain calculations about the likely course of the war. For his part, Hitler, too, did not believe that French resistance had been foreclosed. After the armistice, he remained deeply distrustful of Vichy intentions; he thought Vichy might well heed de Gaulle's call to continue the fight from the colonies. Although his military officers pushed him to take advantage of France and Britain's historic rivalry, Hitler replied that France would never be a true Axis ally and would, one day or another, find itself on Britain's side.⁶⁹ Hitler's distrust led him to approach French offers of collaboration with skepticism. Only after Hitler's fears were assuaged somewhat by the Vichy defense of Dakar did the German leader agree to meet with Pétain and Laval. After the Montoire talks, Hitler cautiously agreed that France could offer its help as a nonbelligerent in the fight against Britain.⁷⁰

66. Jäckel, *La France dans l'Europe de Hitler*, p. 141.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 157–162.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

Both the conquering power and the occupied state were aware that renewed resistance was a possibility. France could have defected to the Allies with its North African army and its surface navy at any point over a period of nearly two and a half years. Even after the Allied invasion of Morocco and Algeria in November 1942, when the Armistice Army in North Africa defected to the allies and Germany occupied the rest of France, the Vichy regime had options. For example, it could have dissolved itself and, following the Dutch example, put day-to-day administration in the hands of the bureaucracy. All of these options, however, involved serious risks; France faced unpalatable and constrained choices. Yet, the expected effect of nationalism is to increase the willingness of actors to accept the risks and burdens of resistance. Instead, the Vichy government intentionally chose a path of collaboration that was far more extensive than what Germany could have imposed upon the French government unconditionally.

Throughout the war, Germany preserved sufficient combat power to defeat any attempt by the French government to return to war on the side of the Allies on the European continent. The maintenance of internal order, however, was carried out mainly by French forces. The German army maintained a large presence in France during the second half of 1940 in preparation for its ultimately aborted invasion of Britain. By the close of the year, however, German forces were shifted to the east to prepare for Operation Barbarossa. By July 1942, only twenty-one German divisions were stationed on French soil; this number appears to have fallen further by the close of 1942.⁷¹ As the threat of a U.S.-British invasion grew from the beginning of 1943 on, Germany gradually increased its forces, reaching 1.5 million personnel by D-Day. Yet, the vast majority of these troops was dedicated to coastal defense and fell under a chain of command different from that of the occupation authority.

According to Peter Lieb and Robert Paxton's calculations, the number of German troops responsible for internal order in France stood at about 80,000 in January 1941; fell to about 47,000 by May 1942; then reached a maximum of slightly less than 100,000 prior to D-Day.⁷² Assuming a wartime French population of 41 million—intermediate between the 1936 and 1946 census calculations—these figures represent troops-to-population ratios of 1.95 per 1,000 in 1941, 1.15 per 1,000 in 1942, and 2.44 per 1,000 in 1944. By comparison, the United States had 6.6 troops per 1,000 inhabitants in Iraq at the outset of post-conflict operations in 2003.⁷³

71. See Peter Lieb and Robert O. Paxton, "Maintenir l'ordre en France occupée: Combien de divisions?" (Maintaining order in occupied France: How many divisions?), *Vingtième siècle: revue d'histoire*, Vol. 112 (October/December 2011), p. 116, doi:10.3917/vin.112.0115.

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 123–125.

73. See Nora Bensahel et al., *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq* (Santa

Furthermore, the vast majority of German occupation troops belonged to low-quality territorial defense battalions (*Landeschützenbataillone*). These were later supplemented with many non-German units. Twelve battalions of these inferior troops were deployed in Paris; another fifteen were assigned to guard prisoner-of-war camps inside France. Of the remainder, most were assigned to the defense of bridges, railroads, and bases.

Article 3 of the Armistice put responsibility for domestic order in the hands of the French government. The primacy of the French role in domestic repression was formalized in two agreements between German SS Gen. Carl Oberg and French Secretary-General of Police René Bousquet in July 1942 and April 1943, which gave French security forces the exclusive authority to arrest French citizens unless Germans were directly attacked or threatened.⁷⁴ About 50,000 gendarmes, the mobile guards, and the mobile reserves were given primary responsibility for this mission, supplemented by the regular French police and, later, 30,000 members of the irregular Milice Française and Franc-Garde.⁷⁵ Of the mechanics of the occupation system, Lieb writes: "The Germans were satisfied with installing only *Feldkommandanturen* [Field Garrison Headquarters] as the local occupation authorities in every French *département*. These *Feldkommandanturen*, consisting of only a handful of officers, controlled the French administration and police by personal contact with the administrative head of each *département*, the *préfet* (prefect); persons unreliable in German eyes were replaced with more loyal ones . . . [This system] allowed the Germans to save administrative personnel as well as occupation troops."⁷⁶ Ordinary French citizens had little occasion to interact directly with the Germans. France was administered largely by its own officials, in both the occupied and unoccupied zones, in an arrangement Robert Gildea describes as a "system of indirect rule."⁷⁷

It is impossible to know how the French people would have acted in the absence of repressive force.⁷⁸ What we do know is that, during the period when

Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 17. One influential analysis of post-conflict stability operations recommends a minimum of ten soldiers and one and a half police officers per one thousand inhabitants. See Seth G. Jones et al., *Establishing Law and Order after Conflict* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005), p. xiii. For a critical analysis of force-to-population ratios in counterinsurgency operations, see Jeffrey A. Friedman, "Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine," *Security Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October 2011), pp. 556–591, doi:10.1080/09636412.2011.625768.

74. Paxton, *Vichy France*, pp. 295–297.

75. Lieb and Paxton, "Maintenir l'ordre," p. 121.

76. Peter Lieb, "Few Carrots and a Lot of Sticks: German Anti-partisan Warfare in World War Two," in Daniel Markston and Carter Malkasian, eds., *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (London: Osprey, 2008), pp. 83–84.

77. Robert Gildea, *Marianne in Chains: In Search of the German Occupation, 1940–1945* (London: Macmillan, 2002) p. 56. See also Mazower, *Hitler's Empire*, p. 432.

78. We do know that armed resistance to the Germans was much more widespread in Central and

the smallest number of German forces resided on French soil and part of the country was entirely unoccupied, the armed Resistance was at its weakest.⁷⁹ We also know that French security forces did a large portion of the Germans' dirty work for them, even in the occupied zone and even after France was fully occupied in November 1942.⁸⁰ The policing of conationals is itself a puzzle for theories that link nationalism to resistance. We conclude that it was not repression that maintained France in a state of collaboration. Rather, collaboration led to effective repression, which undoubtedly played some role in deterring and thwarting resistance.

COLLABORATION AND THE CONDITIONS OF OCCUPATION

If the German footprint in the provinces of France was so small, perhaps the striking lack of resistance can be attributed to relatively benign conditions of occupation. Perhaps the German occupiers forestalled mass resistance by treating the population well enough that resistance was unappealing; some segments of the French population may even have complied because they sympathized with their occupiers on ideological grounds.

It is noteworthy that neither of these possibilities sits comfortably with the conventional understanding of what it means to be a nationalist. According to most accounts, foreign occupation itself ought to provoke nationalist resistance, because it impinges on the nation's right to self-rule. Regardless of how well the occupying power behaves, the fact of occupation ought to be offensive enough to prompt resistance among nationalists. Further, there is little evidence in the literature to suggest that shared ideological commitments ought to trump national loyalties. Still, if an occupying power is able to capture "hearts and minds" it may encounter less resistance.

Eastern Europe, where physical repression of the population was far more extensive and brutal. Mazower notes that resistance movements across the European continent often postponed armed action in favor of "the secret army approach to resistance" in order to avoid costly German reprisals and to protect "the smaller-scale strategically valuable sabotage and intelligence-gathering activities that resistance groups could also carry out." See Mazower, *Hitler's Empire*, p. 473.

79. A good indicator of resistance is the frequency of railroad sabotage, a principal modality of the armed French opposition. The postwar inspector general of the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (National Society of French Railroads), Paul Durand, compiled data on wartime sabotage events. According to his work, there were no such events in 1940; however, there were 30 in 1941, 108 in 1942, 1,384 in 1943, and 4,523 in the eight months of 1944 prior to the liberation of most French territory by the Allies. See *Relevés de bombardements, mitraillages, sabotages, classes par régions (1940-1944)*, Fond Paul Durand, box 72AJ/485, Archives du Comité d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, fonds privés et documents divers relatifs à la période 1939-1945, National Archives, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, France.

80. Liberman argues similarly for all of occupied Europe, "Pacification was so successful and required so few German personnel because of police collaboration in each occupied country." Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?* p. 49.

Neither of these conditions—lenient treatment by the Germans or French ideological sympathy—appears to account for French reactions to the occupation. First, French collaboration did not arise from a lack of German provocation. German policy toward the French was mild compared to the annihilation program enacted in Eastern Europe, but few scholars would argue that the French thought the occupation was benign. Nearly 150,000 residents of Alsace and Lorraine were displaced from their homes, and another 130,000 were forcibly conscripted into the German military.⁸¹ French citizens who fled south ahead of the Germans were refused permission to return home to the northeast. The Germans refused to repatriate about 900,000 French prisoners of war until the conclusion of the war.⁸² French hostages were shot as collective punishment for armed resistance. Suspected members of the Resistance were tortured, deported to concentration camps, or summarily executed. Jews were deported to death camps in large numbers. French workers were forced into industrial slavery in Germany under the Service du Travail Obligatoire. Internal boundaries dismembered France territorially and administratively, restricting travel and communication between regions.⁸³ German exactions on the French economy led to years of shortages and malnutrition. In sum, the German occupation of France, though not so far-reaching as to foreclose any opportunities for resistance, was hardly benign enough to explain overwhelming compliance.

Collaboration also did not stem from enthusiasm for German domination or Nazi ideology. In Stanley Hoffmann's view, the French were collaborators in behavioral terms; they were not collaborationists in ideological terms.⁸⁴ Public opinion is difficult to measure under military occupations, but the most careful studies of French public opinion tend to conclude that most French people were hostile to Germany throughout the war, critical of the government at Vichy from early on, and initially enthusiastic but increasingly unsympathetic toward Marshal Pétain as the years passed.⁸⁵ Ideological collaborationism was a relatively marginal phenomenon; even the Vichy authorities were suspicious of French fascists and kept them at arm's length.

81. See Laird Boswell, "Should France Be Ashamed of Its History? Coming to Terms with the Past in France and Its Eastern Borderlands," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol. 9, Nos. 2–3 (June–September 2008), pp. 241–242, doi:10.1080/14690760802094867.

82. Burrin, *France under the Germans*, p. 143.

83. See Eric Alary, *La ligne de démarcation, 1940–1944* (The line of demarcation, 1940–1944) (Paris: Éditions Perrin, 2003).

84. Hoffmann, "Collaborationism in France during World War II," p. 376.

85. See Pierre Laborie, *L'opinion française sous Vichy: les Français et la crise d'identité nationale, 1936–1944* (French opinion under Vichy: the French and the national identity crisis, 1936–1944), rev. ed. (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2001); and John F. Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 137–169.

Taking stock, widespread French collaboration with the German occupiers cannot be explained by a lack of French nationalism, either among the Vichy leadership or the population at large; by a lack of opportunities to resist given a forbidding level of German repression; or by the absence of motives for rebellion based on lenient German occupation policies. If none of these arguments withstands scrutiny, nationalism does not play the conventional role predicted by existing scholarship. In sum, nationalism does not explain the behavior of the members of the paradigmatic nation-state, France, when occupied by their historic archrival of the prior century, Germany.

THE LOGIC OF COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE IN FRANCE

If the above explanations do not account for French behavior during World War II, what does? In our view, Pétain and other members of his regime opted for collaboration based on a two-pronged assessment of their strategic situation at the international and domestic levels.

The international context begins to explain why the government chose collaboration over resistance. Pétain and the Vichy regime concluded that, given the balance of power on the continent, the best strategy for France was to side with Germany. The domestic context, in which the French Left had made significant electoral gains, further encouraged collaboration with Germany, which offered the Right a pathway back to political dominance. Domestic cleavages also help to account for the composition of the Resistance, which was dominated by the Left.

The French strategic outlook at the beginning of the war was fairly straightforward. Although many French conservatives doubted the wisdom of a war against Germany because they saw Soviet communism as the greater long-term threat, the evidence suggests that France was quite unified during the early phase of World War II, prior to the German invasion of France.⁸⁶ The collapse of French armies in May 1940, however, dramatically changed France's strategic situation: Germany had won what, up to that point, was a purely European war. Russia had a nonaggression pact with Germany. Italy was, belatedly, a belligerent on Germany's side. Britain had been evicted from the continent, lacked a land army powerful enough to contest the Germans, and had no reasonable prospect of constructing one. The United States was powerful but neutral. German armies had advanced deep into French territory; the French army was collapsing.

Moreover, France confronted what seemed a highly probable future in which Germany would dominate Western Europe. Contemporaneous evi-

86. Jackson, *The Fall of France*, p. 119.

dence shows that French officials expected the British to negotiate an end to the war.⁸⁷ But even if Britain were to continue the war in alliance with a French government based in the colonies, a seaborne invasion of France was a highly dubious prospect, even with massive U.S. support.⁸⁸ In the unlikely event of an invasion, it was thought to entail a titanic clash of armies on French soil that had the potential to make the fighting of 1914–18 pale by comparison. Given the strategic map of June 1940, a reasonable observer could easily conclude that, although continuing the war was possible, ongoing resistance would entail grave risks, both immediate and long term.⁸⁹

The French leadership faced an unpalatable choice: continue the resistance from overseas or find an accommodation with Germany. Both options could be defended on nationalist grounds. Hitler made the second option more appealing by offering armistice terms better than what he could impose unilaterally. In addition to the terms outlined above, France would continue as a sovereign state prior to a peace agreement, and it seems clear that French decisionmakers believed final peace negotiations would follow expeditiously. Collaboration was seen as a way to show good faith in preparation for those negotiations. To be sure, the French expected German terms to be hard. They expected to lose Alsace and Lorraine; they expected vast indemnities and the imposition of limits on remilitarization; they expected to have to reshape their foreign policy in conformity with German requirements. In sum, they expected a peace within the general framework of prior European geopolitics: a readjustment of the balance of power in which they would take a place, perhaps temporarily, outside the ranks of the great powers. French leaders also expected, however, that France would continue as a sovereign state, an outcome they risked losing if they opted to continue the war, as some French political figures advocated.⁹⁰

87. Paxton, *Vichy France*, p. 9.

88. See two reports by U.S. Chargé d’Affaires H. Freeman Matthews in November 1940: The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State, November 14, 1940, 9:00 p.m., *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1940*, Vol. 2: *General and Europe* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1957), pp. 403–407, doc. 479; and The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1940, 7:00 p.m., *FRUS, 1940*, Vol. 2: *General and Europe* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1957), pp. 411–414, doc. 481. Matthews directly quotes both Pétain and Pierre Laval (in separate, private meetings) arguing that Britain’s best hope was for a “drawn peace,” in which France would remain under German hegemony.

89. It is vital in this connection to keep in mind the difference between what was possible and what was prudent for France. As we have argued above, continuing resistance was feasible in 1940, but given what French decisionmakers knew at the time, their choice looks like it was a strategic best reply.

90. Following a July 29, 1940, meeting with Pierre Laval, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Robert Murphy reported: “Laval is convinced that Germany has no intention to crush France . . . [He] left Paris assured that the Germans entertain no such notion but that their plan contemplates a European federation of states in which France will play an important role compatible with its dignity and

Hitler, for his part, appears not to have formulated a clear, long-term policy toward the French. In the short term, France was to serve German economic needs and, by remaining neutral, complicate British policy in the Mediterranean. Beyond that, France would assume an as-yet-to-be-determined but relatively privileged place in the brutal racial hierarchy of German-dominated Europe. Given the circumstances, it is not difficult to see how collaboration might have appeared not only consistent with nationalism, but even a nationalist duty.

Although collaboration was the dominant French response to the occupation, there was resistance as well, particularly in the final year prior to the liberation. A focus on the geopolitical situation does a good job of explaining why collaboration was so extensive in France, but it cannot explain why some elements of French society risked imprisonment, torture, or death to fight not only the Nazis, but their collaborating countrymen as well. What accounts for this variation?

Characterizing the political coalitions that supported collaboration and resistance is complicated, as both groups were diverse. Activists in the Resistance ranged from politically conservative military officers such as de Gaulle to the Stalinists of the PCF. The Vichy coalition even included a small group of socialists and non-communist trade unionists.⁹¹

In spite of this diversity, Vichy was a right-wing government, dominated by conservative military officers, traditionalist regional elites, and activists of the interwar Right. These traditionally powerful groups in French society were politically marginalized and radicalized by the spectacular growth of the Left's electoral coalition during the 1930s. The 1936 elections—the last of the Third Republic—were a political watershed for France. The PCF doubled its vote share. The extreme Right also saw dramatic gains, reflecting an electorate much more polarized than it had been in 1932. For the first time in the history of the Third Republic, the PCF entered the governing coalition, which was dominated by the socialist Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (French Section of the Workers' International) and its leader, Léon Blum. During the subsequent two years, France witnessed an enormous increase in labor conflict and industrial strikes, the rapid growth of right-wing extremist and paramilitary groups, and a significant anti-democratic movement within the military.

The fall of France swept away the institutions of the Third Republic in

tradition." The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State, July 29, 1940, 5:00 p.m., *FRUS, 1940, Vol. 2: General and Europe* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1957), p. 378, doc. 463.
91. See Paxton, *Vichy France*, pp. 273–279.

Table 1. Political Competition and Resistance in France

	Dependent Variable		
	Resistance Members ^a	Acts of Sabotage ^a	Acts of Sabotage ^b
Constant	527.34** (56.64)	56.72** (10.14)	3.98** (0.029)
Left-Right vote share, 1936	226.26** (85.59)	44.75** (15.37)	0.87** (0.044)
Center vote share, 1936	123.31 (269.87)	-27.18 (48.58)	-0.42 (0.14)
R ²	0.081	0.091	0.093 [†]

SOURCES: Situation dans les départements: Ain, dossier 1, box 72AJ/90, Archives du Comité d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et fonds d'origine privée, Guerre de 1939–1945, National Archives, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, France; Mitrailages—Bombardements—Sabotages, Année 1944. Fond Paul Durand, box 72AJ/486, Archives du Comité d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, fonds privés et documents divers relatifs à la période, 1939–1945, National Archives, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, France; and Lachapelle, *Elections législatives, 26 avril and 3 mai, 1936: résultats officiels* (Legislative elections, April 26 and May 3: official results) (Paris: Le Temps, 1936).

^aOrdinary least squares regression.

^bPoisson regression.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; [†]pseudo R².

which the Left had won its dominant position and opened the door to the revenge of the Right. The leaders of the Front Populaire were put on trial, leftists were purged from the administration, and the persecution of the PCF was intensified. In Paxton's words, "Antibolshevism is the nearest thing to a Vichy common denominator."⁹² The policies of the National Revolution advanced by Vichy were profoundly right-wing and aimed to reverse decades of leftist victories.

Peter Liberman casts doubt on the claim that right/left political contestation played an important role in explaining collaboration and resistance in occupied Europe.⁹³ We are able to test this proposition against original sub-national data collected from the French National Archives and published data on the 1936 French parliamentary elections. Table 1 presents our results.

We examine two indicators of resistance activity. The first is a departmental-level count, per 100,000 people, of individuals whom the postwar French government recognized for their participation in the wartime resistance.⁹⁴ The

92. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

93. Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?* pp. 58–61.

94. Situation dans les départements: Ain, dossier 1, box 72AJ/90, Archives du Comité d'histoire

second is a departmental-level count of acts of sabotage against the French railways in 1944.⁹⁵ We regress both of these indicators of resistance activity on electoral support for the Left versus the Right in 1936. We calculated the share of the first-round vote for the parties that composed the left-wing Popular Front (which received about 57 percent of the total) minus the vote percentage for the Right (which garnered about 17 percent of the total).⁹⁶ The resulting variable ranges from -0.68 (extremely right-wing, in the Department of Mayenne) to 0.74 (extremely left-wing, in the Department of the Var). We control for the vote share of parties in the center, given that votes lost to the Left (Right) may be lost to the center, rather than the Right (Left).

Our data strongly support the claim that electoral support for the Left was an important determinant of both membership in the Resistance and concrete acts of violent resistance against the German occupation. A difference of about one standard deviation in the vote share variable is associated with a difference of about one-third of a standard deviation in the number of Resistance members in a department. A one standard deviation difference in the electoral strength of the Left corresponds to a difference of about one-third of a standard deviation in the number of Resistance members in a department. Varying the vote share variable from its minimum to its maximum corresponds to a difference of about forty-four acts of railroad sabotage in 1944 (one standard deviation in the department-level sabotage count is equal to fifty acts).⁹⁷

One potential counterargument is that the Left-Right divide masks a difference in the strength of national identification; perhaps the leftists were simply more nationalistic than those on the Right.⁹⁸ This hypothesis is not one that ap-

de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et fonds d'origine privée, Guerre de 1939–1945, National Archives, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, France. The issue of these Cartes de Combattant Volontaire de la Résistance required a thorough review of the applicants' wartime records. About 43 percent of all applications were rejected.

95. *Mitraillages—Bombardements—Sabotages, Année 1944*. Fond Paul Durand, box 72AJ/486, Archives du Comité d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, fonds privés et documents divers relatifs à la période, 1939–1945, National Archives, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, France.

96. We followed Georges Lachapelle's ideological grouping of the parties. Lachapelle, *Elections législatives, 26 avril et 3 mai, 1936: résultats officiels* (Legislative elections, April 26 and May 3: official results) (Paris: Le Temps, 1936), pp. viii, 328–332. The French electoral system in 1936 had single-member districts and second-round runoffs for districts without a first-round majority. The party system was highly fragmented, especially on the right.

97. For further analysis of these data, including a richer set of control variables, see Matthew A. Kocher and Nuno P. Monteiro, "Lines of Demarcation: Causation, Design-Based Inference, and Historical Research," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (December 2016), pp. 952–975, doi:10.1017/S1537592716002863.

98. Ideally, one could test this proposition against our resistance data. The literature, however, offers few clues about how to systematically code nationalist sentiment. We tested literacy as a proxy for nationalism (not shown), and it was neither statistically nor substantively significant—which should not be surprising, given the very high level of literacy and the low degree of variation across the departments of France.

pears to have proponents. Although there is a large literature on the historical roots of both Vichy and the Resistance in the politics and society of the late Third Republic, perhaps revealingly, this literature has virtually nothing to say about nationalism. It is simply not an important concept in the historiography of the period. Major histories of Vichy do not even include the term in their indexes.⁹⁹

Histories of interwar France use the term “nationalist” as a synonym for “right-wing extremist,” and apply it to radical militant factions such as the Croix de Feu and Action Française—groups from which, ironically, Vichy later drew some of its most ardent supporters. By contrast, the extreme-left PCF was an ideologically internationalist party that consistently advanced a pro-Moscow line.

In fact, there was a curious reversal of attitude between the mainstream French Left and Right during the interwar years. Until the mid-1930s, the French Left was generally liberal in its outlook on foreign affairs, in the pacifist, internationalist mold of the 1920s socialist leader Aristide Briand. The rise of Hitler and, to a lesser extent, the Spanish Civil War, led to a substantial departure from this course. French rearmament began under Blum’s Popular Front government, which gradually moved toward greater confrontation with Germany during the remainder of the 1930s; Édouard Daladier’s centrist government eventually took France to war in 1939 with the support of the parliamentary Left.

For a decade or more following World War I, the French Right was extremely anti-German. During the 1930s, however, many right-wing Frenchmen came to see Germany as the lesser evil in European politics vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The growing power of the Left in domestic politics, and particularly of the PCF, played a key role in this process. Many on the French Right saw in communism an internal threat to the nation that influenced their perception of external threats as well. Partly as a defensive reaction, there was a significant flirtation with fascism on the Right during the 1930s, though the more conservative and traditionalist Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese regimes were more often taken as models for France than was German National Socialism.¹⁰⁰ Even so, most admirers of fascism valued it for the dynamic example it could offer to a French leadership, not because they wanted France to be dominated by other states.

99. See Paxton, *Vichy France*; Kedward, *Resistance in Vichy France*; Paxton, *Parades and Politics at Vichy*; Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France*; Wieviorka, *Une certaine idée de la résistance*; and Jackson, *France*.

100. Jackson, *France*, p. 151.

Fear of Soviet communism drove many rightists toward a reluctant accommodation with Germany, which took the form of appeasement before the war and collaboration during the war. Likewise, geopolitical fear of Germany, coupled with the terrifying example of fascism in Spain, led the French Left to abandon its cherished commitment to peace and international liberalism. Short of using their interwar and wartime policy preferences toward Germany as evidence of nationalism, which we cannot do as these preferences are precisely what nationalism is meant to explain, there is no compelling evidence that the French Left was systematically more nationalistic than the French Right.

Our analysis demonstrates that nationalism alone could not have played the role assigned to it in existing theories of the consequences of military occupation. The direction of the effect of nationalism is posited to point toward resistance, whereas the dominant response of the French was collaboration. Nor can nationalism explain why some resisted and others did not. Nationalism was too widespread in France to account for this variation. Under the dire circumstances of World War II, French nationalists such as Marshal Pétain did what they believed was best for France. By leveraging collaboration for domestic reform, they opened political fissures that helped produce the French Resistance.

Conclusion

In a conversation with U.S. Chargé d’Affaires H. Freeman Matthews on November 4, 1940, Vichy Vice Prime Minister Pierre Laval, remarked, “You may say that in the long run a people cannot be kept down and that is true but it is only in the long run. For the present we can do nothing.”¹⁰¹ Laval’s insight captures nicely why nationalism can fail to trigger resistance to occupation. The Vichy leaders believed that continued resistance would worsen the situation of France. They argued that the nation’s continued sovereign existence was best served by cooperating with Germany. In the domestic realm, collaboration offered good prospects of defeating their political enemies, principally the French Left.

How exceptional was the Vichy leadership? In hindsight, it is easy to appreciate their folly. The geopolitical environment evolved in ways that few foresaw, bringing two budding superpowers into the anti-Nazi coalition. An amphibious landing on the Continent proved more feasible and less destruc-

101. The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State, November 14, 1940, 9:00 p.m., p. 405.

tive than Pétain feared. Peace with Germany eluded Vichy's grasp, while German demands and exactions escalated without end.

Yet Vichy's choice to collaborate was neither a miscalculation nor an aberrant outcome. Collaboration with foreign military occupiers has proven a successful strategy of national revival in other instances. Following the military disasters of Jena and Auerstadt in 1806, Prussia steered a cautious course of collaboration with France, during which it revitalized its institutions and rebuilt its military forces. When Napoleon stumbled in the Russian campaign of 1812, Prussia was prepared to return to war and played a central part in France's ultimate defeat. Following World War II, West Germany and Japan accepted Allied occupation, emerging within a few decades as two of the world's most prosperous and secure nations. For many cases in which one may reasonably question the aggregate wisdom of collaboration, pro-occupation elites have successfully leveraged foreign rule to capture or maintain power. The communist parties of Central and Eastern Europe that collaborated with Soviet military occupations dominated their states for decades. The right-wing elites that collaborated with the World War II German occupation dominated Greek politics for many years. Some postcolonial states continue to be ruled by elites that previously governed under colonial domination; the surviving Arab monarchies fit this pattern. In short, cases of nationalist collaboration are pervasive. As in France, international considerations as well as domestic politics can favor a policy of collaboration, even where governments and leaders are committed nationalists.

More recently, the Shia factions that cooperated with the U.S. occupation of Iraq look set to rule the country indefinitely. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and deposed the mostly Sunni ruling elites of the Baath Party. By imposing electoral democracy with universal suffrage, the United States all but guaranteed that a new political elite, most likely Shia, would dominate the central government. This *de facto* alliance between the U.S. occupation and principally (though not exclusively) Shia collaborators drove the pre-invasion elite into revolt and produced a conflict that was simultaneously a civil war and a war of resistance to military occupation. Later, key elements of the resistance coalition found themselves caught in a three-way pincer between the targeted violence of the U.S. military, the brutal ethnic cleansing of the Shia political party militias, and a bid for hegemony within the insurgency by al-Qaida in Iraq. These "Sons of Iraq" collaborated with U.S. forces to defeat the most radical elements of the Sunni insurgency, lowering the level of violence dramatically and paving the way for a U.S. withdrawal.

Although the Iraqi insurgency has been interpreted as a function of nationalism, there is no convincing *ex ante* evidence that the Iraqis who collaborated

with the United States were less nationalistic than those who resisted. Surveys conducted during the occupation showed that most Iraqis wanted U.S. forces out.¹⁰² Yet the U.S. military secured the willing collaboration of some Iraqis from all the major ethnic and religious groups. The sectarian character of the war and the prevalence of collaboration led many observers to conclude that Iraq had a weak national identity. Nothing about the facts of the case, however, compels this conclusion. It was the victory of collaboration that led directly to the end of the U.S. occupation.

The widespread phenomenon of collaboration with foreign occupation creates insurmountable problems for prevailing views of the relationship between nationalism and resistance. The international relations literature predicts that nationalism will motivate actors to defend the nation in specific ways: they will absorb enormous costs to fight a foreign conqueror, and they will tenaciously resist occupation. Yet as we have shown, nationalism is associated not just with fighting foreign domination, but also with accepting it.

The theory we have proposed promotes an understanding of nationalism as a flexible discourse that can be wedded to a variety of political behaviors. In this light, the partisan divergence in attitudes toward Russian intervention in the 2016 presidential election in the United States appears as part of a larger pattern, not an anomalous artifact of the particular characteristics of Trump supporters. Nationalism, when tied to domestic politics, can lead actors to emphasize some threats over others and accept some forms of foreign influence if it improves their standing relative to other domestic forces. Nationalist commitments are adapted to geopolitical and domestic political circumstances. These propositions await broader evaluation, but the theoretical scope of the argument is potentially broad. Further investigations can uncover whether similar dynamics operate in other cases of foreign occupation, and where foreign intervention occurs in more minor or subtle ways.

102. For a roundup of opinion polls conducted in Iraq, see James Paul and Celine Nahory, "War and Occupation in Iraq" (New York: Global Policy Forum, June 2007), pp. 111–112.